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The relationship between Marxism and justice has always been con-
tentious. Interpretations range from Marx as an amoralist who 
believed that moral norms were always a product of a specific histori-
cal mode of social organization, to Marx as a fervent moral opponent 
of capitalism who believed that capitalist exploitation was inherently 
unjust. During the 1970s and 1980s this debate reached its fullest 
development within the movement of Analytical Marxism. Analyti-
cal Marxism sought to apply the tools of analytical philosophy to 
Marxist political philosophy in an attempt to divorce Marxism from 
the obscurantism of Hegelian philosophy. The obscurantism of 
Hegelian philosophy was associated with its use of the dialectical method 
that seemed to violate the formal logic principle of non-contradiction 
and a highly abstract vocabulary which seemed to obfuscate the con-
cepts being explained. The principle participants in the debate were 
Allen Wood, Ziyad Husami and Gerald Cohen. Wood took the view that 
transhistorical moral condemnations of capitalism were inconsistent 
with Marx’s historical conception of morality. Cohen, on the other hand, 
argued that Marx thought capitalism was unjust but that Marx was not 
aware that he believed capitalism to be unjust. Finally, Husami defended 
the view that Marx regarded capitalism as morally condemnable from 
principles of socialist justice.
In this paper I will focus on the interpretation of Marxian justice by 
Ziyad Husami. In the well-known paper Marx on distributive justice 
(1978), Ziyad Husami argues, in opposition to Allen Wood and Richard 
Tucker, that Marx regarded the exploitation of workers by capitalists 
as unjust. Wood and Tucker read Marx as only condemning economic 
systems internally, that is to say, according to standards set by the 
superstructure and ideology which arise from those economic systems 
and never from a transepochal point of view. Husami’s contention 
is that capitalist exploitation is unjust because it violates what he 
interprets as Marx’s socialist principle of justice, ‘from each according 
to his ability, to each according to their contribution’. Husami argues 
that in order to end capitalist exploitation, the private ownership of the 
means of production must be abolished in favor of state ownership. In 
this paper I wish to advance three claims against Husami’s specific inter-
pretation of Marxian justice. Following and refining Burczak (2003), 
Ellerman (1992), and Resnik and Wolff (1987), I want to argue that 
Husami’s conception of what DeMartino (2003) calls appropriative jus-
tice does not fully capture what is unjust about capitalist exploitation. 
Secondly, I argue that Husami’s proposed solution to socialize the means 
of production will not in fact eliminate exploitation. Lastly, I wish to 
argue that an alternative socialist project of worker control and private 
(in the sense that capital is owned by individuals and not a collective 
authority such as the state) ownership of the means of production is 
desirable not only because it upholds appropriative justice but because 
it allows for the achievement of what Wood (1979) calls the ‘non-moral 
good’ of self-actualization, an idea Marx inherited from Hegel. Wood 
calls goods such as freedom, self-actualization, and community ‘non-
moral goods’ because they are regarded as good in virtue of their ability 
to satisfy the “potentialities, needs, and interests of human beings” rather 
than good because they conform to the precepts of a moral theory (1979, 
p. 289). Self-actualization, like happiness, is regarded as a non-moral 
good because it is seen as desirable, in accordance with a certain concep-
tion of human nature, even though no moral credit is attached to its 
pursuit alone. 
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1. Husami’s ‘socialist principle of justice’
Husami defends Marx against the charge of amoralism by Wood and 
Tucker, that is to say the view that nothing is intrinsically right or wrong. 
Husami does so by clarifying that in the Marxian sociology of morals the 
fact that a norm arises or pertains to one historical mode of production 
does not rule out its use in the evaluation of other historical modes of 
production (1978, p. 34). Specifically, Husami contends that Marxist 
principles of justice can be derived from the critical, revolutionary stand-
point of proletariat consciousness, which develops its own standards of 
justice contrary to those of the dominant mode of production, capital-
ism, and the dominant class in that mode of production, the bourgeoisie. 
Whether or not Husami is correct in interpreting Marx as being commit-
ted to a standard of justice in criticizing capitalism will not be the topic 
of this paper. I will assume for the purposes of this paper that Husami is 
correct in deriving his socialist principles of justice from Marx himself. 
I aim instead to provide an internal critique of Husami. My argument 
is that given Husami’s own principle of socialist justice as derived from 
Marx, his account of appropriative justice fails to locate what is unjust 
about capitalist exploitation according to that very same principle.
 Husami defines exploitation as the “extraction of surplus labor 
or surplus value from the worker and its appropriation by the capitalist 
without compensation” (1978, p. 47). I understand appropriation here in 
the traditional Marxian sense of the word as ‘receiving directly into his 
or her hands’ or ‘becoming the first title holder of ’, that is to say claim-
ing a property right on the product (Wolff & Resnik, 2012, p. 155). 
Husami’s definition of exploitation follows, of course, from Marx’s 
well known labor theory of value, whereby the value of a commodity 
is defined by the amount of labor-time that went into its production. 
For Marx the amount of labor-time which is needed to reproduce the 
worker’s labor-power in a given day is what determines the wage that 
the capitalist pays the worker. Specifically, the wage is determined by 
the labor-time needed to produce the bundle of consumption goods 
necessary to maintain the worker’s labor-power or ‘capacity to work’ 
according to the socio-cultural standards of a given historical epoch. 
Hence it is a subsistence wage, in that the labor-value of the wage is equal 
to the labor-values of the commodities needed to ensure the physical and 
social survival of the worker. For Marx, exploitation follows from the fact 
that the amount of labor-time which goes into making the product the 
worker produces is greater than the amount of labor-time which goes 
into reproducing the worker’s labor-power in a given day. The worker 
is thus robbed of the extra or surplus value created by the surplus labor, 
which the capitalist appropriates in the form of profit.
Husami proceeds to show how the exploitation occurring in the 
capitalist system can be viewed as unjust as it violates two fundamen-
tal Marxist principles of distributive justice found in Marx’s Critique 
of the Gotha programme (1875): the socialist principle ‘from each 
according to his ability to each according to his contribution’ and the 
communist principle ‘from each according to his ability to each accord- 
ing to his need’. The crucial point Husami wants to make is that in 
the just socialist society, workers would receive “consumption goods 
embodying an amount of labor equal to the amount of labor [they] 
contributed” (1978, p. 41). That is to say, in a socialist society work-
ers would appropriate the surplus value originally appropriated by the 
private owners of capital since they no longer receive merely the pro-
duct of the “necessary labor-time”, the exchange-values of the worker’s 
means of labor-power reproduction, but also the product of the labor 
they expend after producing their means of subsistence (Marx, 1976, 
p. 325). Crucially, Husami believes that the socialist principle of justice 
requires the abolition of private property, with the means of production 
either becoming state property or social property. If exploitation, the 
appropriation of surplus value by the capitalist who did not share in the 
process of surplus labor, is a necessary consequence of some individuals 
having ownership rights to the means of production to the exclusion of 
others then, for Husami, it follows that ending capitalist exploitation 
requires the abolition of private property rights in regards to society’s 
capital assets. Husami believes that by abolishing the private ownership 
of the means of production, socialism represents a marked advance over 
capitalism for two principal reasons. Most importantly, by socializing the 
means of production no person can receive an income stream in virtue of 
the ownership of capital; all people are regarded as workers who receive 
a share of the total social product (after necessary deductions) equivalent 
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to the amount of labor-time embodied in the commodities they produce. 
Secondly, Husami regards the socialization of the means of production as 
a way in which society can establish rational and collective control over 
its total social product, by allowing for deductions of the social product 
on the basis of shared collective needs rather than the private interests of 
individual capital owners as under capitalism (1978, p. 43). 
2. The notion of appropriative justice
DeMartino (2003) distinguishes between three different elements of jus-
tice in relation to the social processes of class in his conceptualization 
of what he terms ‘class justice’: productive justice, appropriative justice, 
and distributive justice. Following DeMartino, productive justice refers 
to “the fairness in allocation of the work of producing social surplus”, 
appropriative justice refers to “fairness in the processes by which some 
individuals and/or groups in society receive the social surplus produced by 
themselves or others”, and distributive justice to “fairness in the processes 
by which the social surplus is distributed among society’s members for 
their personal use and in the distributive patterns that emerge from these 
processes” (2003, pp. 8-9). The three dimensions are clearly overlapping 
since patterns of justice in appropriation will affect patterns of justice 
in distribution and vice versa. Nonetheless, the three process of class 
justice are conceptually distinct for the reception and the distribution of 
the product are two different concepts. The distribution of the product 
occurs after the product is received, therefore the two processes are not 
necessarily linked. In reality, however, the process of receipt usually bears 
on the process of distribution as well, especially if the appropriators will 
also serve as the distributors of the product. For the purposes of this 
current critique I will focus exclusively on the notion of appropriative 
justice, specifically to show why Husami’s notion of appropriative justice 
does not fully capture what is unjust about capitalist exploitation.
Following Burczak, I interpret Husami as regarding exploitation to 
be unjust because “surplus labor and only surplus labor is appropriated 
by someone who did not participate in the production of that sur-
plus” (Burczak, 2006, p. 104). This principle of appropriative justice 
can be contrasted with those of Marxists like John Roemer who view 
exploitation as occurring in the sphere of exchange rather than produc-
tion. Roemer defines exploitation as “the unequal exchange of labor for 
goods [whereby] the exchange is unequal when the amount of labor 
embodied in the goods which the worker can purchase with his income 
is less than the amount of labor he expended to earn that income” (1985, 
p. 30). Roemer, for example, would argue that independent commod-
ity producers can be exploited because even though they appropriate 
the full product of their labor they cannot retain the full value they 
produce since they have to make payments to land, capital, and credit 
providers in order to gain access to privately owned means of production 
(Burczak, 2006, p. 106). Both Husami and Roemer identify the private 
ownership of the means of production as the locus of capitalist exploita-
tion. In contrast to both of these views, Burczak regards the important 
question to ask as: “Who is the legitimate appropriator of the whole 
product, not just the surplus product?” (p. 111). That is to say, who 
should appropriate all the new assets created in the production processes, 
as well as the liability (costs) for the used-up productive factors? Whereas 
Husami’s principle of appropriative justice emphasizes the right of 
those who produce the surplus product to appropriate it, Burczak and 
Ellerman emphasize the right of those who produce the entire product 
to appropriate it. Both Husami and Burczak, however, still espouse the 
idea that the producers of the product (whether surplus or total product) 
have the appropriating rights. As DeMartino reminds us, however, in 
addition to the onsite productive and nonproductive workers, numerous 
other workers beyond the specific enterprise can be said to contribute to 
the production of the total or surplus product; in essence, production 
can never be isolated from the constellation of social relations and pro-
cesses which provide the conditions for its existence. I follow DeMartino 
then in reconceptualizing Burczak’s principle of appropriative justice in 
the weaker form whereby “those who directly produce [the total product] 
are not excluded from fair and meaningful participation in appropriation” 
(DeMartino, 2006, p. 18). 
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3. Ellerman’s conception of appropriative justice
The difference in Husami’s principle of appropriative justice stems from the 
fact that Husami is still committed to the traditional Marxian theory of value 
whereas Burczak follows Ellerman in replacing the labor theory of value with 
the ‘labor theory of property’. Ellerman defines the ‘labor theory of property’ 
as the normative principle that “people should appropriate the positive and 
negative fruits of their labor” (Ellerman, 1992, p. 25). Positive fruits here 
refers to the assets created during production and negative fruits to the costs 
during the same production process. Ellerman eschews talk of surplus value 
as the source of exploitation since, as he concludes, there is nothing unique 
about labor as a measure of surplus value which cannot be reformulated in 
terms of another productive factor, such as a ‘spinning-machine theory of 
value’ where “more ‘spinning-time’” is extracted than is equivalent to “the 
day’s ‘spinning-power’” (Ellerman, 1992, p. 40). ‘Spinning-time’ here refers 
to the amount of ‘spinning-hours’ contained in the textile commodity that 
is produced. ‘The day’s spinning-power’ refers to the amount of ‘spinning-
hours’ needed to maintain the operation of the spinning-machine for a day. 
Spinning-hours are thus analogous to labor-values in this example. The injus-
tice of exploitation in Ellerman’s labor theory of property arises from the fact 
that the agents who are responsible for the production of labor’s product (the 
sum of the newly created commodities and the labor services expended to 
produce them) are not the agents who have the appropriating rights in the 
capitalist firm. Ellerman employs a specific conception of appropriation in 
his elaboration of the labor theory of property. In regards to “newly manu-
factured commodities”, appropriation is simply defined as “becoming the 
first title holder to an asset” while regarding the liabilities employed in the 
production of commodities, specifically the consumption of labor-power in 
the capitalist process, appropriation is defined as being the last owner of 
a property right (Burczak, 2006, p. 104). To give a specific example, an 
automobile that emerges from a production line has no preexisting property 
right attached to it; someone must become the first owner of the newly 
created automobile or it will lie to waste like unpicked apples in an orchard. 
Likewise, the input liabilities employed in producing an automobile, such 
as electric power or the worker’s labor-power, are extinguished once used 
in the production process. Therefore the owner of these liabilities is the last 
owner as electric power and labor-power no longer exist once consumed. 
4. Ellerman’s Kantian grounding for appropriative justice 
The labor theory of property is made into a normative theory by 
invoking the ‘juridical principle of imputation’, the principle whereby 
“people should have the legal responsibility for the positive and negative 
results of their intentional actions” (Ellerman, 1992, p. 25). Applied to 
the realm of production, the juridical principle of imputation is trans-
posed into the labor theory of property. For Ellerman responsibility is a 
property that follows from intentionality and since intentionality can only 
be assigned to mental states, it follows that only labor, which is the only 
factor of production that can be assigned mental properties, can be said to 
be responsible for the production of the total output and equally responsible 
for the labor-power consumed in the production process. Labor is thus 
responsible both for its positive product, the total output, and the nega-
tive product, the labor-power consumed. In Ellerman’s perspective, to sell 
one’s labor-power as a commodity, as is the case under capitalism, would 
be to transfer both responsibility and hence ownership of the positive 
product (the firm’s total product) of one’s actions and responsibility and 
ownership of the negative product of one’s actions (the costs incurred 
in production) to an external agent, the capitalist. It is important to 
note that when I use the terms ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ here I am not 
making a normative claim that the newly created product is the beneficial 
aspect of the production while the costs incurred are the non-beneficial 
aspect of production. I am merely using the words positive and negative 
to refer to the process of creation and destruction. That is to say, when 
an asset is created it can be termed a ‘positive’ act; in contrast, when 
an input-liability is destroyed or consumed it can be termed a ‘nega-
tive’ act. Through alienating himself from the ownership of his labor-time 
and from the ownership of his labor-time’s product, the worker has been 
exploited by the capitalist and this exploitation is regarded as unjust 
because it treats the worker solely as a means and not as an end-in-itself, 
violating the central Kantian categorical imperative (Ellerman, 1988, p. 
1110). The key point to be made here is that the removal of the laborer’s 
legal responsibility (he is no longer legally responsible for the assets or 
liabilities of his actions) in his employment contract is what renders him 
a mere thing or tool. 
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One might object that the Kantian imperative states that people 
should not be treated merely as a means, and that in the production process, 
although workers are treated as a means, they are also treated as ends-in-
themselves. Ellerman states that he is himself not interested in remaining 
completely faithful to the Kantian imperative so he does not really respond 
to this charge and instead is satisfied with emphasizing the aspect in which 
workers are treated as a means. I would argue, however, that the very fact 
that labor is to be regarded by definition as an input, whose presence or 
participation is necessary for the fulfillment of the ends of the firm, means 
that all relations with the workers must ultimately be instrumental to the 
extraction of his labor or at least not interfere with this process. For example, 
if the owners and managers of a firm are said to treat their workers well or 
with respect, they only do so insofar as either this treatment advances the 
role of the worker as a means or at least does not interfere with the process 
by which the role qua tool produces the firm’s output. Another possible 
objection which can readily be claimed by libertarians is that in denying the 
worker’s the ostensibly voluntary act of selling his labor-power he is in fact 
being treated merely as a means. The objection then is that even if the worker 
is treated as a means inside the production process, if we deny him the 
possibility to let himself be treated as a means inside the production we are 
consequently treating him as a mere means outside the production process!
Two replies to this objection are possible. First, one can accept that in 
banning the ‘voluntary slavery’ that is the wage contract, one is treating the 
worker as a means to an end of social justice but not merely as a means. He 
is not treated merely as a means in the sense that the humanity in the worker 
is still treated as an end given that after being denied the possibility to sell 
himself into wage slavery, his capacity to act as a self-directed rational agent 
is not violated. Secondly, and this follows from the first reason, the Nozick 
case of voluntary slavery necessarily treats a human being merely as a means 
because in entering the contract he no longer allows the possibility that his 
humanity is treated as an end. For Kant, our humanity is the collection of 
features that make us distinctively human, which include the capacities to 
engage in self-directed rational behavior and to adopt and pursue our own 
ends. The case of entering into voluntary slavery would violate the Kantian 
imperative to treat ‘the humanity’ in human beings as an end itself. A human 
being who enters into such a contract, even if it was voluntary, is entering 
into a position that no rational agent can consent to, for a human being who 
agrees to be treated as a means, or thing, in the production process is agree-
ing to treat himself in such a way that he cannot exercise his rational capacity 
to be self-directed and to adopt and pursue his own ends. Furthermore, 
consenting to become a wage slave would clearly violate what Kant regarded 
as the primacy of the moral law over self-love for in such a case the rational 
nature of humanity (which is an end in itself ) in the employee is being 
treated as a mere means to the conditional good of wealth which satisfies the 
self-love of the employer (Wood, 1999, p. 143).
To summarize, Ellerman’s conception of appropriative justice locates 
the phenomenon of exploitation in the simple fact that under capitalism 
the person who is causally responsible for the output and input-liabilities 
of his actions, namely the laborer, is not held to be legally responsible for 
those same products of his actions. I now turn to Husami’s crucial claim 
that in order to end exploitation it is necessary to abolish the private 
ownership of the means of production. Although Marx himself believed 
that only the social ownership of the means of production could bring 
about the fullest development of society’s productive forces and the fullest 
development of man’s Gattungswesen (species-being), it is important to note 
that Marx himself made the distinction between private property per se and 
capitalist private property. Marx contrasts “private property which is per-
sonally earned, i.e. which is based as it were on the fusing together of the 
isolated, independent working individual with the conditions of labor” with 
capitalist private property characterized by “the exploitation of alien, but 
formally free labor” (Marx, 1976, p. 928). Nonetheless, Marx believed that 
private ownership of the means of production would ultimately have to give 
way to social or state ownership since the productive forces of capitalism 
were too far developed and the social relations too complex to permit going 
back to a small-scale economy of independent commodity producers. 
The mistake that Husami, following Marx, makes is assuming that the 
contractual roles constituting the firm come in a bundle so to speak, or as 
Ellerman puts it “the fundamental myth of capitalist property rights” (1992, 
p. 6). To put it in more specific terms, the fundamental myth assumes 
that the rights of residual claimancy, the rights of bearing the costs of the 
inputs used in the production process and the rights of owning the firm’s 
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outputs, follow necessarily from the ownership rights of the means of pro-
duction, the capital assets such as the machinery and the plant used in the 
production process (Ellerman, 1992, p. 12). Ellerman stresses that prop-
erty rights are a category which include many specific rights which do not 
necessarily follow from each other. Ownerships rights, residual claimancy 
rights, and control rights all fall under the category of property rights. 
However, rights to own the means of production do not imply a right 
to residual claimancy or what is equivalent, the right to appropriate the 
firm’s total product. As it so happens, in reality the holders of ownership 
rights also tend to be the holders of residual claimancy rights. How-
ever, this need not be the case. For example, a labor-managed firm may 
have residual claimancy, or appropriating rights, to capital even though 
they only rent out the capital equipment from private individuals and thus 
do not have ownership rights on the capital assets. To give a further his-
torical example, during the Communist1 regime in the Soviet Union 
all the means of production were nationalized and placed under state 
ownership, with the assumption that the state was the representative of the 
working class. As Wolff and Resnik make clear, however, even though the 
Soviet state nationalized property ownership, the workers themselves did 
not collectively appropriate the surpluses they produced inside the firms in 
which they worked. The rights of appropriation instead went to the Soviet 
state officials (Wolff & Resnik, 2012, p. 338). A more promising route 
advocated by ‘market socialists’ such as Ellerman (1992), Burczak (2006), 
and Bowles and Gintis (1993, 1994) is to make workers residual claimants 
of the firm while allowing workers to rent or lease the capital assets, such 
as the machinery needed in the production process. Gregory Dow (2003) 
presents one such modest proposal to achieve this goal through workers 
creating a workers’ trust which gradually buys back the shares of the firm 
from its shareholders, while leasing the capital equipment needed for pro-
duction; workers ultimately receive a ‘wage’ construed as a payment of 
dividends on the equity capital shares they own in the firm. By making 
workers residual claimants of the firm, while the means of production are 
leased, appropriative justice in Ellerman’s sense is upheld as “workers are 
jointly the first owners of the manufactured output and the final owners 
of the input liabilities, specifically their collectively owned labor time” 
(Burczak, 2006, p. 110). 
5. Hegel’s ethical theory of self-actualization2
I have established that the principle of appropriative justice as interpreted 
by Ellerman and Burczak does not require abolishing private owner-
ship of the means of production, only that workers are made residual 
claimants. I now would like to give the principle of appropriative jus-
tice a more authentically Marxian interpretation by grounding it in the 
Hegelian ethical theory of self-actualization. For Hegel self-actualization 
is acting in accordance with the human good as given by a historically 
determined human nature which is socially and culturally contextualized. 
In the literature on appropriative justice, normative force is given to the 
principle of appropriative justice by either grounding it in a Kantian con-
ception of treating people as ends-in-themselves (Ellerman, 1992) or on 
any of the several capability theories advanced by Sen and Nussbaum, for 
example (Burczak, 2006). I have already explored the Kantian justifica-
tion for upholding appropriative justice vis-à-vis Ellerman’s labor theory 
of property. The capability justification for upholding appropriative justice 
is grounded on the idea that all members of society should have equal 
capabilities to function as appropriators of the social product entailing 
meaningful participation in decisions regarding the use of the firm’s total 
(or surplus) product (DeMartino, 2003, p. 21). The capability frame-
work, as I interpret it, is silent regarding what is to be regarded as a valued 
functioning and therefore I do not find it to be very informative regard-
ing what is normatively appealing about appropriative justice. However, 
to be fair, I have only mentioned one specific conceptualization of the 
capability approach and given that many alternative conceptions exist it 
may well be that an alternate conception of the capability approach can 
just as effectively ground a principle of appropriative justice as a Kantian 
framework. As appealing as I find the Kantian justification for uphold-
ing appropriative justice, in the final part of this paper I will try to find 
a normative grounding for appropriative justice that is more faithful to 
Marxian philosophical thought. Given that Marx took Hegel and not 
Kant as his point of philosophical departure, naturally, we will have to 
find normative justification for appropriative justice in Hegel if we wish 
to stick more closely to Marx’s philosophical language.
38
Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy Victor van der Weerden | Socialist Principles of Appropriative Justice
For Hegel self-actualization is a dialectical process whereby a per-
son, mediated by the collective consciousness of historical cultural 
forms, seeks to understand both who he is and who he ought to be and 
to actualize this self through the pursuing of principles and ends which 
are seen as consistent with the kind of self he is and ought to be. In 
Hegel’s conception of self-actualization the distinction between theoreti-
cal reason, and practical reason disappears as the two sides of reason (or 
spirit) are seen to be mutually interconnected. Following Kant, Hegel 
defines theoretical reason as knowledge of what is, while practical rea-
son is defined as knowledge of how things ought to be. In the process 
of self-actualization practical reason and theoretical reason are dialecti-
cally conjoined, as each form of reason presupposes the existence of the 
other form of reason. Theoretical reason presupposes a concern with 
what I am and what I ought to do, thus presupposing practical reason. 
Likewise, in actualizing practical reason the will reveals what I am, thus 
presupposing theoretical reason. For Hegel, what I am is a being whose 
vocation is to know itself and actualize its knowledge of the self, or what 
he calls Freedom (Wood, 1990, p. 32). By using the word vocation, Hegel 
is making the teleological claim that knowledge of self, and the actuali-
zation of this knowledge, is the end, or purpose, of human nature. As 
Wood explains further, both Hegel and Marx regard the self that is to be 
discovered and actualized as a historical product, mediated through 
the specific social processes of a historical time period (p. 33). The 
connection between self-actualization and appropriative justice can 
now be drawn. The historical process reveals that an element of man’s 
self-knowledge is his conception of his nature as a productive animal. 
Through his nature as a productive animal he seeks to actualize himself 
through laboring on the inorganic and organic matter of nature and in so 
doing sees himself in the objects he produces. This leads him to further 
redefine his self-conception as productive being. The productive activity 
of man becomes itself an object of his will and consciousness and through 
this process of self-consciousness man makes not only his own nature his 
object but his nature as man, as a member of a species, and hence in so 
doing he defines what it means to be human (Marx, 1964). In a society 
where workers are alienated from their own product in that they are 
denied the ability to appropriate the product of their labors, not only does 
the commodity they produce confront them as alien, but their very pro-
ductive life-activity and hence their own self appear as not their own. In 
denying the worker the capacity to define himself through his productive 
activity, he is being denied the ability to actualize himself and know his 
self through actualization. He is being denied the Freedom, as a being 
whose vocation it is to know himself and actualize this knowledge, which 
makes him human (Wood, 1990, p. 17). For Hegel self-actualization is 
what makes human beings human beings. It is essential to what we are. 
Human beings are beings that are constantly self-actualizing themselves. 
Appropriative injustice, thus, dehumanizes mankind.
6. Conclusion
The relationship between Marxian social theory and theories of justices 
has always been an uneasy and complicated one, since Marx actively 
sought to avoid the normative language which many read into his 
critique of capitalist exploitation. In this paper I have examined one 
particular theory of socialist justice, Husami’s principle of appropriative 
justice, in which laborers should have the right to appropriate the surplus 
product they produce. Since the workers are the ones contributing 
to the production of surplus value, they should be given the right of 
appropriation to this surplus product. I have then criticized Husami’s 
notion of appropriative justice on two crucial aspects. First I followed 
Ellerman and Burczak in identifying the injustice of exploitation 
as stemming from the fact that workers do not appropriate the total 
product rather than the surplus product. Second I criticized Husami’s 
contention that ending capitalist exploitation requires the socializa-
tion of the means of production by exposing his commitment to what 
Ellerman terms the ‘fundamental myth of capitalist property rights’. 
Lastly I argued that grounding a principle of appropriative justice in the 
Hegelian theory of self-actualization, rather than a Kantian theory of rights 
or a capability approach of human flourishing, is far more faithful to Marx’s 
condemnation of capitalism for its denial of fundamental non-moral 
goods.
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Notes
1. Communist in name only, given that it’s economic structure was in essence a form of 
state socialism.
2. I follow Wood (1990, p. 17) in defining an ethical, as opposed to a moral theory, as 
a theory that is “grounded in a knowledge of human beings that enables us to say that 
some modes of life are suited to our Nature, whereas others are not. In that sense, ethical 
theories generally may be regarded as theories of human self-actualization.”
Bibliography
Bowles, S., & Gintis H. (1993). Agency, incentives, and democratic accountability. 
In S. Bowles, H. Gintis, & B. Gustafsson (Eds.), Markets and democracy: 
Participation, accountability, and efficiency. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
 (1998). Efficient Redistribution: New rules for markets, states, and 
communities. In E.O. Wright (Ed.), Recasting egalitarianism: New rules for 
communities, states, and markets. New York: Verso. 
Burczak, T. (2006). Socialism after Hayek. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
DeMartino, G. (2003). Realizing class justice. Rethinking Marxism, 15(January), 
1-31.
Dow, G. K. (2003). Governing the firm: Worker’s control in theory and practice. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ellerman, D. (1988). The kantian person/thing principle in political economy. 
Journal of Economic Issues, 22(4), 1109–1122.
 (1992). Property and Contract in Economics. Cambridge Mass.: Blackwell.
Husami, Z. I. (1978). Marx on distributive justice. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 
8(1), 27-64.
Marx, K. (1964). Economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844. New York: 
International Publishers.
 (1976). Capital (B. Fowkes, Trans.). New York: Vintage.
Resnick, S. A. & Wolff, R. D. (1987). Knowledge and class: A marxian critique of 
political economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Roemer, J. (1986). Should marxists be interested in exploitation?. In J. Roemer 
(Ed.), Analytical marxism (pp. 260-262). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Wood, A. W. (1979). Marx on right and justice: A Reply to Husami. Philosophy & 
Public Affairs, 8(3), 267-295.
 (1990). Hegel’s ethical thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 (1999). Kant’s ethical thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wolff, R. D., & Resnick, S. A. (2012). Contending economic theories: Neoclassical, 
Keynesian, and Marxian. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported 
License. For more information, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
